Nuevo libro: Narcotráfico y crimen organizado ¿Hay alternativas?

Novedad en Icaria Editorial

Narcotráfico y crimen organizado

¿Hay alternativas?

 

Mabel González Bustelo

 

Las drogas ilegales, y las políticas nacionales e internacionales para combatirlas, tienen impactos graves en términos de paz y seguridad. Este libro muestra cómo se ha construido el consenso global para prohibir ciertas drogas y cómo EE UU lleva a cabo su “guerra contra las drogas”, especialmente en América Latina, con un enfoque basado en la militarización que ha generado violencia y violaciones de los derechos humanos.

La fumigación de millones de hectáreas en Colombia y las decenas de miles de muertos en México no han logrado frenar la producción y tráfico de drogas ilegales. El análisis de ambos países muestra un mercado ilegal con una capacidad de adaptación asombrosa. La fragmentación de los antiguos cárteles y la reacción a las presiones externas ha llevado a una reconfiguración de las estructuras y operaciones.

Los grandes capos ya no existen. Quienes dominan hoy el negocio de las drogas son grupos descentralizados y organizados como la red  2.0.

La prohibición convierte a las drogas en un mercado muy lucrativo y, por tanto, permanente, del que obtienen beneficios tanto actores ilegales como legales.

El Norte tiene un papel crucial en este negocio: no solo son sus mercados los que impulsan la producción y el tráfico, sino que aquí se queda la mayor parte de los beneficios. Este libro también analiza algunas propuestas que ahora surgen sobre una nueva política global de drogas.

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AQUÍ PUEDES LEER EL ÍNDICE e INTRODUCCIÓN

MÁS INFORMACIÓN

 ARTÍCULO en EL HUFFINGTON POST: 

¿Se acabó la ‘burbuja’ de Peña Nieto?

3 de noviembre de 2014

Otros artículos:

Colombia and Mexico: The Wrong Lessons from the War on Drugs

Sustainable Security, 26 June 2014

Drogas ilegales: La guerra interminable

IECAH, 28 de junio de 2013

 

Visita la página del libro en Icaria Editorial si quieres saber más

Exporting security? Questioning Colombian Military Engagement in West Africa

With skills and expertise in fighting insurgencies and drug trafficking networks, Colombia’s armed forces are increasingly being sought for engagement in similar security challenges in West Africa. But increasing Colombian engagement gives rise to a number of important questions – not least of which is the goal and expected outcomes of replicating militarised approaches to the war on drugs that have already failed in Latin America.

(—)

These approaches are being increasingly questioned in Latin America and continue to lose support even among high Government representatives and Presidents. Replicating them without further evaluation and careful reflection about what has worked – and what has not – is not a promising approach. Instead, approaches to drugs and organised crime in West Africa must be based on lessons learned, to avoid the repetition of past ineffective policies and their harmful effects.

These are excerpts of my first post in the blog Sustainable Security, a project of the Oxford Research Group. Both, highly recomendable for all those interested in the long-term drivers of global insecurity, and in an approach that prioritises the resolution of the interconnected underlying drivers of insecurity and conflict and the emphasis on preventative rather than reactive strategies.

If interested, you can access the whole article here.

 

The US and Colombia: building an exportable model of security

I have just published an article in Open Security about the past, present and future of the Colombian Armed Forces and their potential role and influence in a future peace and post conflict setting. After a decade of build-up they are the first Army in Latin America and enjoy high degrees of autonomy.

Through the laboratory of Plan Colombia, the US has developed its ‘stabilization’ model for counter insurgency operations. To some extent it has replicated in Colombia its own model of armed forces, counter insurgency and counter narcotics. Now the Colombia forces provide training and specialized services throughout Latin America and worldwide.

With a peace agreement with the FARC on the horizon, what is the future for Colombia’s overinflated military?

Continue reading here.

This article is part of an excellent series, Conflict in Context: Colombia, where you will find analyses in Spanish and English about the array of war and peace challenges faced by Colombia.

 

EE UU y Colombia: construyendo un modelo exportable de seguridad

Acabo de publicar un artículo Open Security. En él se analizan unas fuerzas armadas, las colombianas, que han crecido para hacer frente al conflicto y ahora son el primer ejército de América Latina. Este hecho, y la influencia de EE UU, hacen preciso analizar cuál puede ser su futuro en un eventual escenario de paz y cuál su influencia en determinar las características de éste. ¿Acometerán un proceso de reducción de efectivos e influencia o responderán por pasadas violaciones de los derechos humanos? EE UU está promoviendo a Colombia como un centro de entrenamiento de operaciones antinarcóticos y contrainsurgencia y difundiendo así su propio modelo de política de seguridad. Esto puede tener una gran influencia en un futuro escenario posconflicto. 

Puedes leer el artículo en español aquí.

El texto forma parte de una excelente serie, Conflict in Context: Colombia, donde encontrarás otros análisis, en español e inglés, de los retos que afronta Colombia, en el conflicto y en la paz.

 

 

How to End Mexico’s Drug War

(Cross-posted from The Knotted Gun Blog, in e-International Relations, January 21, 2014).

Policy Recommendations:

To find a peaceful conclusion to its bloody drug war, Mexico should:

1) Focus on long-term state-building efforts, rather than short-term military actions against drug trafficking organisations (DTO). 2) Create a coherent strategy to deal with DTO and self-defence organizations and, as an absolute priority, restore law and order and provide citizen security. 3) Prioritise security sector reform, as well as addressing failures of the justice system, to reduce corruption, improve governance and accountability and restore citizens’ trust in all arms of government. 4) Contribute to ongoing international debates about drug policies in the Organization of American States, and in the 2016 Special Drug Policy Session of the UN General Assembly.

Analysis:

One year after Enrique Peña Nieto took office as the new President of Mexico, violence and insecurity are still rampant in the country. The promised changes in the security strategy and new approaches to fight organized crime have been little more than rhetoric and results remain limited. The ‘war on drugs’ continues amidst widespread human rights abuses and little accountability; security sector reform is stagnated, and new self-defence armed groups have emerged in areas where the rule of law is weak or absent. Mexico will need more than promises to change the course.

One of the first measures of the new Administration was the ‘Pact for Mexico’, an agreement among the three main political parties with important provisions for security sector reform. An old aspiration to improve coordination among multiple, disperse and in some cases corrupt police forces was agreed upon, as well as a vetting system to reduce levels of corruption. The Pact also encompassed the creation of a new civilian Gendarmerie and resources to address inefficiencies in the justice system. Another element was a $9 billion commitment for a plan of violence prevention centred in education, poverty reduction and community development.

However, the government has mostly relied on the same security strategies of the past. Military forces still play the key role in the fight against organized crime and abuses remain. The Gendarmerie has been limited to a civilian special force within the Federal Police. By mid-October, the National Public Security Council extended by one year (more) the deadline for purging and certifying local and federal police officers.

Mexico is another collateral victim of the drug war ‘balloon effect’. The effort to weaken the Colombian drug cartels included the creation of the South Florida Task Force in 1982 and improvement of aerial surveillance of drug trafficking routes. When the Caribbean routes were effectively closed down, transportation shifted to the Pacific and land routes, and Mexican drug traffickers gained pre-eminence due to their control of the US border. The defeat of Cali and Medellin and decentralization of the drug business in Colombia led to a transformation of the cocaine economy with the epicentre and bulk of the business moving to Mexico.

The drug war scaled up in this country under President Vicente Fox (2000-2006) but especially with Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), who transformed this policy in the driving force of his Presidency. Corruption and lack of coordination among multiple police forces was resolved by resorting to a militarized approach to fight the drug trafficking organizations (DTO). Thousands of soldiers were deployed to seize drugs, target drug ‘kingpins’, and take over and secure areas under DTO control.

What resulted was a war against the cartels, and wars among and within them. Destabilization of the market led to fierce competition over routes, territories and local markets, while the detention and sometimes extradition of high profile drug traffickers led to violent struggles for power. The Army, a respected institution though not prepared for internal security missions, became involved in gross violations of human rights. In six years, around 70,000 people died and 25,000 more disappeared amidst soaring levels of violence.

The drug market managed to survive under pressure. Some DTO regained foot while others fragmented, the market became more decentralized and violence spread as a result. They also diversified their range of criminal activities (and sources of profit) to include migrant smuggling, extortion, kidnapping and traffic in arms and chemical precursors, among others. The main groups are heavily armed, have international alliances and ties, and spread their operations and presence in Central American countries. Currently the Sinaloa Federation reigns amidst a decentralized market composed by smaller –but very violent- organizations.

Under Peña Nieto, there have been limited reductions of the murder rates while kidnapping and extortion have soared. Violence and insecurity remain unabated.

An aggravating phenomenon illustrates the failure to regain state power and enforce the rule of law. Self-defence (vigilante) groups have arisen in a number of states, although the epicentre seems to be in Michoacán and Guerrero. Thousands of civilians have armed themselves to form self-defence organizations. In October 2013, 1,000 soldiers were deployed to Michoacán when self-defence groups clashed with members of the Knights Templar drug ring (born in 2011 as a break-up of La Familia Michoacana).

In Michoacán, vibrant economic sectors such as agribusiness and cattle owners were subject to extortion, racketeering and kidnapping, as were small businesses and ordinary citizens. The self-defence groups aim to put an end to those practices and recover security. Currently they have taken over 54 municipalities, often with local police evacuated or detained (sometimes amidst accusations of collusion with organized crime).

The citizen response may be understandable in the current circumstances but also illuminates the limits of state power. The expansion of self-defence groups adds a new layer of complexity to an already intractable conflict scene. Some analysts have warned that this movement could anticipate an evolving new dimension, towards a political-military conflict. There is no doubt that territories held by those groups are, such as others under control of organized crime, beyond any state authority.

The federal government has attempted both dialogue with and de-legitimization. But state reliance on self-defence groups is an expression of its inability to guarantee citizen security. Some of them are born of the best intentions, while others may be vulnerable to infiltration by spurious interests. The line that separates self-defence from paramilitary forces is frequently very thin, as Colombian history teaches. The more armed non state groups are at stake, the more possibilities that violence runs out of control.

Mexico cannot afford to address old problems with already failed strategies. Neither to support well-intentioned short-term solutions that may worsen things at later stages. There is no alternative to state building in the long term. The government needs a coherent strategy to deal with DTO and self-defence organizations and, as an absolute priority, restore law and order and provide citizen security. This is a daunting and long term challenge that requires resources and high levels of political will. Security sector reform is urgent, as well as address failures of the justice system and improve governance and accountability.

But Mexico can do something else. The experience of this country both with the drug trade and the war on drugs makes it a more than legitimate voice to join ongoing international debates about drug policies. Due to the high market value of cocaine (produced only in the Andean region) and the proximity of the main market in the US, Latin American countries have suffered a great range of consequences of the US-led drug war. It has caused militarization, violence, human rights violations, and in some places aggravated state fragility. Now, a number of these countries are ready to take the lead in debates about international drug policies. There are opportunities at the Organization of American States, and in the 2016 Special Drug Policy Session of the UN General Assembly. Mexico has a good option in joining them.

Mabel González Bustelo is a journalist, researcher and international consultant specialized in international peace and security, with a focus on non-State actors in world politics, organized violence, conflict and peacebuilding.